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American mutual fund is an investment pool organized in the form of a 
corporation or trust to facilitate collective investments and it managed by a 
professional investment manager outside the mutual fund itself, and thus causes the 
inherent conflicts of interest between the fund shareholders and manager. There are 
conflicts of interest between the fund investors and manager in chinese securities 
investment fund too, and it is wise for us to learn from the American experiences of 
mutual fund governance and supervision. 
Besides the introduction and conclusion, this article is divided into four chapters: 
Chapter 1 analyzes the American mutual fund conflicts of interest arising from 
fund fees.12b-1 fees deduct annually from the fund’s assets and pay the marketing 
expenses for attrating more fund shareholders. The fund manager has a great interest 
in maximizing the size of fund, but the current fund shareholders bear the cost of 
attracting new shareholders. Thus, 12b-1 fees bring the conflicts of interest between 
the shareholders and manager. Improper soft dollar arrangements also cause the 
conflicts of interest, because it gives fund investment advisers a means of shifting 
research sevices costs that they would otherwise pay from their own resourse to the 
mutual fund and shareholders. 
Chapter 2 analyzes American mutual fund conflicts of interest in the process of 
the fund management and transaction. Investment Company Act requires forward 
pricing, but the late trading and market timing arrangement between some fund 
shareholders and fund manager or broker dealer allow some shareholders to make a 
trade using stale prices with the cose borned by the other mutual fund shareholders, 
thus they bring the fund conflicts of interest. 
Chapeter 3 analyzes American mutual fund governance for settling the conflicts 
of interest. The American Investment Company Act and related rules created a 
particular structure for fund governance that relies, in large part, on each fund’s 
independent directors to guard against the conflicts of interest inherent in the fund’s 
interactions with its investment adviser. The fund information disclosure is the core of 














hidden fees and fund management and transaction arrangements could provide better 
protection to fund investors. 
Chapter 4 analyzes American experiences of mutual fund governance and 
supervision for China. First is the American experiences of mutual fund governance 
for China and some legislative sugessions, then comes to the American experiences of 
mutual fund supervision for China and related legislative sugessions. 
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前   言 
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前   言 
证券投资基金起源于英国，但得到真正发展的是在美国。2006 年，美国的






















                                                        






























第一节  12b-1 费引起的主体利益冲突分析 
 
一、12b-1 费规则的设立目的及变迁 
1980 年，美国证券交易委员会 SEC(Securities and Exchange Commission)通
过了 12b-1 费规则，该规则允许在满足一定的程序性的条件后①直接使用基金的
资产来支付基金的营销费用。②根据 12b-1 费规则提取的用于支付基金的营销费
用就被称为 12b-1 费（12b-1 fees）。美国全国证券交易商协会 NASD（National 
Association of Securities Dealers）规定，基金支付的 12b-1 费不得超过基金资产






② SEC.Division of Investment Management: Report on Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses [R], Footnotes 64. 
[EB/OL].http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 


























投资顾问和基金的发行销售商的。但是到了 2004 年时，只有 2%的 12b-1 费是被
用来支付广告和其他有关基金的营销推广活动的费用。③截止到 2006 年，美国有
70%的基金有 12b-1 费方案（12b-1 plans），这些费用的首要的目的是用来支付给
金融投资咨询顾问费和其他相关服务费。现在的 12b-1 费模糊了以前泾渭分明的
基金营销成本与管理成本，且有相当部分的基金股东并未从任何服务机构处获得
咨询服务，但仍要负担 12b-1 费用。 
在美国，12b-1 费虽然被广泛的使用和接受，但现在越来越多的媒体、专家






而基金股东并不能从 12b-1 费方案中受益，相反，基金的现有股东（current 
shareholders）承担了招揽新的基金股东的费用，这对基金的现有股东是不利的。
12b-1 费的合理性主要在于其为基金投资者支付购买基金的费用增加了一种选
                                                        
① NASD Rule 2830, NASD Manual, (CCH) 4621(2000). [EB/OL]. 
http://www.sentinare.com/pdf/NASD_Conduct_Rules_2000-3520.pdf, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
② Form 19b-4, Notice of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to 
the limitation of Asset-Based Sales Charges as Imposed by Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No.29, 
070, 48 S.E.C, Docket 976 (Apr. 12, 1991). 
③ ICI.How Mutual Funds Use 12b‑1 Fees,Fundamentals, Vol. 14, No. 2. Investment Company Institute, February 
2005 (“February 2005 Fundamentals”). [EB/OL].http://www.ici.org/pdf/fm-v14n2.pdf, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
除基金营销之外，12b-1 主要还用于支付第三方提供的服务于基金现有的股东的相关的管理费用，如基金股
东的交易服务，保持基金股东记录等. 
ICI.Background Information About 12b-1 Fees. [EB/OL]. 
http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/ref_12b1_fees.html, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
④ SEC.Speech by SEC Chairman: Address to the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Seventh Annual Policy 
Conference by Chairman Christopher Cox, Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC (April 13, 
2007),2–4 (“Chairman Speech”); and Speech by SEC Staff: Keynote Address at 2007 Mutual Funds and 
Investment Management Conference by Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, 
















择。SEC 发布的 12b-1 规则允许基金提供关于基金营销费用的不同的收费模式，
以满足不同投资者的不同需求。① 





















                                                        





③ LORI WALSH. The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1 Plans: An Examination of Fund Flows, 
Expenses and Returns, [EB/OL]. http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
④ LORI WALSH. The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1 Plans: An Examination of Fund Flows, 
Expenses and Returns. [EB/OL].http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
⑤ 收费基金是通过经纪商向投资者销售基金，投资者在购买基金时向经纪商支付佣金。该销售佣金是从投






















SEC 对于 12b-1 费的规制的主要措施除了授权基金董事会，特别是独立董事













                                                        
① LORI WALSH. The Costs and Benefits to Fund Shareholders of 12b-1 Plans: An Examination of Fund Flows, 
Expenses and Returns. [EB/OL]. http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70904/lwalsh042604.pdf, 2007-09-20/2007-12-20. 
② N-1 格式是根据美国 1940 年《投资公司法》中有关基金注册和 1933 年《证券法》中有关证券注册使用
的一种格式.美国的基金招募说明书使用这种格式对核心内容进行表述. 






顾问的管理费比基金 B 高，有可能意味着基金 A 支付给投资顾问的费用确实要比基金 B 高，也有可能意味
着基金 A 支付的管理费所包含的服务包括了基金 B 分别要支付给投资顾问、投资顾问的关联方或者其他服
务提供的所有费用,亦即实际上基金 A 的费率收取有可能比基金 B 要少得多. 
④ 典型的“其他费用”包括支付给转让过户机构的费用、托管费，会计服务费、律师费，审计费以及支付给
基金独立董事的费用，这些费用是从基金资产中扣除的或者是向所有的基金股东账户里收取的. 
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